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CAPITAL AND WEALTH IN THE DEVELOPMENT PROCESS
Steph en Hymer and Steph en Resni ck*
indus triali ze
A gover nment of an under devel oped count ry attem pting ~o
of priva te entre 
via a strate gy of priva te enter prise must creat e a class
indus trial capiprene urs busin essme n or capit alists to own and manage the
1
The essen ce of the priva te enter prise system is that a large
tal stock .
share of the natio nal wealt h is priva tely owned.

A macro decis ion on the

indus try requi res,
part of state plann ers to incre ase capit al forma tion in
part of the indiv i
there fore, a set of corre spond ing micro decis ions on the
portf olio.
dual wealt h owners to inclu de indus trial asset s in their
e havin g
In the typic al under devel oped coun tries, the number of peopl
to under take in
suffi cient capit al and suffi cient organ izatio nal abili ty
have a large
dustr ial activ ity is relat ively small . A count ry may well
with regar d to man
volume of aggre gate savin gs but still be capit al scarc e
s with large con~
ufact uring if it lacks a suffi cient number of indiv idual
e the large -scal e
centr ation s of wealt h willi ng and able to finan ce and manag
this sense that
enter prise that chara cteriz es modern indus try. It is in
s.
capit al accum ulatio n means the develo pment of capit alist
cteri stics
The purpo se of this essay is to examine the behav ioral chara
a view to under 
of the nativ e capit alist in under devel oped coun tries with
effor ts to
stand ing the proble ms encou ntered by gover nment s in their
asset s. Excep t for
stren gthen this secto r and induc e it to hold indu stria l
helpf ul comments
*The autho rs would like to thank Richa rd Nelso n for hisPa.ck,
and Gusta v
d
Howar
and also expre ss appre ciatio n to Vahid Nows hirvan i,
.
paper
Ranis for valua ble assis tance on an earli er draft of this
t of Capit alism .
1
See, for examp le, Mauri ce Dobb, Studi es in the Devel opmen
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brief side comments we shall not attempt in this essay to analyze the alternative development routes via foreign capital or state enterprise.

In addi

tion, we will not discuss in any detail the important problem of how a native
capitalist.class becomes more efficient in its operation of industrial firms.
However, there may be the tendency to "learn-by-accumulating " in the sense
that once this class begins seriously to own and manage industrial assets,
it becomes more efficient in its entrepreneurial or managerial skills thus
building-up, as it were, a stock of industrial talents.
The essay is divided into three sections.
vestment propensities of the capitalist sector.

The first deals with the in
The second deals with the

al.location of capital within the capital sector given the highly imperfect
capital markets.

A final section raises some questions for empirical research.

- 3 -

I.

The Industr ial Accumu lation Function
In an appendix to his Theory of the Consumption Functio n, Milton Friedma n

makes a most interest ing suggest ion on the nature of economic developm ent.
Perhaps the crucial role that has been assigned
to the savings ratio in economic developm ent
should be assigned instead to the factors deter
mining the form in which wealth is accumul ated:
to the investm ent rather than the savings process ,
as it were.l

•

The analysis of this section attempt s to follow this suggest ion using a model
develope d by Tobin in his studies of individu al and materia l wealth propens ities
in develope d countrie s. 2 Our aim fa to de1·ive an industr ial accumul ation
:f"unction relating the real level of investme nt in industr ial assets

r3

to the

real level of capital ist consump tion C' and the real level of investm ent in
other assets A(= the real change in A where A is capital ist investm ent in
other forms of wecl.th:

gold, money, government securit ies, foreign assets,

land, housing , consumer du~able s, etc.}.
I=t(C ',A)

In other w9rds, C'

.
and A from the

(1)

point of view of the governm ent, can

be regarded as inputs required by the capital ist sector in order to induce

it to accumul ate a desired level of industr ial capital . 4 To derive this

¾f.

Friedma n, A Theory of the Consumption Functio n, p.
2
J. Tobin, Manuscr ipt.
3rndustr
ial capital exceeds cepital ist investm ent in industry to the extent
that the ban!ting system cha.nnel s the savings of workers and profess ionals into
business enterpr ises. We shall, however , avoid a detailed analysi s of how the
terms and availab ility of short term credit affect industr ial investm ent decisio ns,
and define K equal to capital ist net worth, keeping in mind that the true level
of industr ial assett, K, exce~ds K by some proport ion. Since the line of credit
availab le to the firm is typical ly proport ional to total assets or net worth, the
variance of·~ is likely to be small, and the qualita tive error introduc ed into
our analysis -oy this simplify ing assumpt ion is correspo ndingly small.
4
capital ist consump tion produce s capital ists just as workers consump tion is
·an input required to produce le.bor power. See P. Schran, "A Model of Communist
China" for a model tttking into c:1.c~ount the relation ship between workers consump tion
and product ivity. A similar model for a capital ist country would require
an addi
tional equation for capital ist consump tion.

- 4 :function we must analyze how a capitalist decides to allocate his income
between savings and consumption and his savings between industrial assets
and other assets.
The basic model is derived as follows.

By

definition the accumulatio n

of industrial wealth is equal to the total income of the capitalist class
Y' less its consumption and less its investment in non-indust rial assets (in
real terms ) .
I = Y' - C 1

.

-

(2)

A

the income of capitalist in a given period is equal to profits earned in in
dustry plus the return from other assets
(3)

where ri and r 2 are the rates of return on Kand A respectivel y {including
capital appreciatio n). Consumption is some proportion of the level of income
according to the capitalist consumption function

C'

= cY' ,
.

s' = (1 - c)Y'

= sY'.

(4)

Capitalist holdings of non-indust rial assets is some fixed proportion of K
according to the capitalist desires for portfolio balance
A= AK

.

and

A= H.
. 1

(5)

Substitutin g equations 3 to 5 into 2 yields

1

I= l!A Y = l:A

(r1

K + r 2 A)

)
I - _s_ (r1 + ~'r·2.
K* - K - l+A

(6)
(7)

1we are assuming for simplicity that the values of A ands are indepen
dent of the rates of return on capital. A more complicated model would take.
into account·the relationshi p between these parameters and yields.

- 5 These equations show industrial accumulation as a .function of the propensity to
save (s), the propensity to invest in industry (

on capital (r

1

1

;Al

and the rates of return

and r ). l
2

The values of the two key behavioral parameters c and A depend upon the
personality characteristics of capitalists--their thriftiness, foresight, con
servatism, self restraint, venturesomeness, etc.--(as well as the yields on
capital).

The rates of return earned by capitalists on investments depend

upon their skill in generating productive activity and the degree of help given
by the government.

Equation 6 when solved for r

1

gives the required rate of

profit on industrial capital to induce a target rate of growth
l+A
r 1 = -Ar2 + -s- K*.
In many countries, rapid accumulation of capital is costly because the under
developed capitalist class has a high propensity to consume, a high propensity
to invest in unproductive assets, and a low capability of managing manufactlll'ir.g
enterprises.
The importance of s, the propensity to save, is well known and requires

no further analysis.

Following Friedman's suggestion, we will concentrate our

According to equation 6 and 7 the higher is A, the lower will

analysis on A.

be the rate of accumulation of industrial capital if r

--- -

·-

··(If r

1 is

greater than r •

2

2

is greater than r , the opposite is true.) In general the most inter1
eating cases for analysis ar.e those where r is greater than r and capitalists
2

1

2

nonetheless desire to hold non-industrial assets in their portfolio in order to
satisfy some objective other than the maximum rate

or return

such as risk avoid

ance or status. 3
= r

2

= r,

then equation (7) simplifies to K*

s(r - r )
2
1
= - - -- - < O if r

(l+A) 2

3see footnote 1 on p. 4 •

1

>

r2•

= rs.
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For example, capitalists will typically not place 100% of their wealth in
a risky industrial venture but instead will hold a certain fraction in "safe"
low yield securities such as savings accounts, government bonds, or money.

As

long as capitalistn achieve this diversification through investment in local
securities little real cost to the country is involved.

The money deposited

in savings accounts can be channelled back into productive investment provided
the financial intermediaries are suff'iciently developed (typically not the
case in colonial economies).

Similarly, the money invested in government bonds

can be used by the government to subsidize industry or to fine.nee inf'rastruc
ture.

Appropriate monetary policy and appropriate attention to the development

of financial intermediaries can help provide capitalists with a high degree of
individual security, i.e., portfolios weighted towards low-risk non-industrial
securities, while encouraging investment in industry. 1
The problem in most underdeveloped countries, however, is that the desire
for security on the part of capitalists cannot be met locally because of the· :
dangers of inflation and unstable government and thus requires foreign invest
ment f'or its satisfaction.

In order to protect themselves against devaluation

and revolution~ capitalists want to hold a certain proportion of their wealth
in foreign banks or foreign securities.

This f'oreign investment involves a

. definite real cost of the country in the form of imports foregone and, therefore,
slows down the rate of growth of' the economy.

The government has great diffi-

1since A= ~Kand~ is assumed to be fixed independent of changes in r
and r , K* = A*. A relevant question concerns the expansion of A. If A is 1
2
the bottleneck to additional real investment (in our fixed portfolio world),
then how does the government 6A to induce the capitalist to hold 6K? Here a
change in institutional arrangements such as the government's encouragement
of a developing financial intermediary sector may provide the necessary assets
to satisfy portfolio balance. The attempt to create a private capitalist class
should have as its dual the creation and furtherence of banks, insurance com
panies , etc. See, for example , J. Gurley and E. Shaw, ;'Financial Aspects of
Economic Development,'' AER, September 1955.

-·1culty count31 ~acting this tendenc y since the desire to hold foreign assets
is
an inc~ea sing functio n of wealth and the greate r the wealth of the capita
list
class the more they will be willing to pay for the opport unity to hold foreign
assets.

T'nus, there is an inheren t contra diction between a policy to promot e

industr y and a policy to preven t capita l outflow .

The growth of indust ry in a

private enterp rise economy implies a growth of private wealth and an increas
ed
desire to inveat abroad .

Attemp ts by the governm ent to block capita l outflow

will therefo re be offset , in part at least, by increas ing subterf uges on
the
part of the private sector to obtain foreign assets .

In the extrem e case the

governm ent may itself have to bear totally the cost of these subterf uges.
Suppos e the governm ent is commit ted to a certain rate of indust rial
growth and prepare d to provid e the capita list sector with whatev er subsid
iza
tion is necess ary to achieve it.

The require d profit rate r , and hence the
1
require d subsidy is a functio n of the target rate of growth and of A. If'
capita l contro ls can, in fact, lower A by increas ing the costs of investm
ent,
they lower the subsidy require d to mainta in the desired rate of growth .

How

ever, exchang e contro ls may leave A unalte red or even raise it since they
create the e>:pect ation of increas ed contro l in the future and hence a greate
r
attract ivenes s to foreign investm ent.

Capita l contro ls can thus create an

environ ment that encoura ges capita l flight in which case their cost, instead
of being bor1!e by the capita list, is passed on to other sectors of the eocnom
y
as the goveril!Jlent i:-:ic1·eases r , to offset the increas e in A.
1
Investmeu-l; in land
One of the most import ant forms of non-in dustria l investm ent by the
capita lists of underd evelope d countr ies is in real estate held for specul
ative
purpose s or to satisfy a traditi onal desire to be a land owner.

Since land is

- 8 -

f'ixed in supply, no productive costs are assoicated with providing this asset
to capita.lists who wish a diversified portfolio.

The cost to society comes

rather from the increased consumption out of the real capital gains made on
land speculation and the diversion of managerial talent from other industrial

activities towards'.speculation.
Assume that the capitalist class maintains a fixed ratio between the value of' land in his portfolio and the value of industrial capital.
(8)

where Pis the ratio of the price of land to the price of capital and Tis the
fixed quantity of land.

Since land is fixed in supply, the price of land

must rise pari passu with capital accumulation in order to satisfy equation 8.
In other words , P* (the rate of growth of P) must equal K* and

(9)

PT=).!

PT

where

equals real capital gains from capitalist holdings of land.

.

.

(10)

A= PT
rA=PT=).I.

l

2

1

. (11)

Let us now assume that the consumption function of the capita.list class
is

(12)
where

c1

and

c2

represent the respective propensities to consumer out of

come, e.g., Y' = r K, and wealth r A.
2
1

in

The accumulation of industrial wealth is

I= Y' - C'

(13)

.
Basically, the perfect land market we are assuming is like a Rembrandt
market where the increased value of the Rembrandt makes the owner "richer"
without having to sell the masterpiece. Here the very process of capitalist
"investment" in land bids its price up, and we have a pure Pigou effect.
1
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Substituting Equations 11 and 12 into 13 yields

(15) 1
The propensity to invest in land thus slows down the rate of capital ac

cumulation for a given rate of profit and the importance of this factor is
greater the higher the propensity to consume.

In this connection it is interesting to note Keynes' observation:
That the world after several millennia of steady
individual savings, is so poor as it is in accumu
lated capital assets, is to be explained, in my
opinion ,neither by the improvident propensities
of mankind, nor even by the destruction of war, but
by the high liquidity premiums formerly att~ched
2
to the ownership of land and now attaching to money.
The provision of other assets held by capitalists--housing and other dur
able consumer goods--have a direct cost to the country in terms of foreign ex

change and domestic resources.

To the extent that industrial capitalists

finance housing and durables used by other sectors of the economy, their in
vestment is productive since they add to national income.

To the extent the

capitalists finance consumer durables used for their own consumption, their in
vestment must be viewed, in terms of the accumulation function, as one of the
costs of obtaining industrial assets.
¾uation 15 parallels precisely the one derived by Tobin in his analysis
of the effect of the propensity to hold money on consumption.
2
General Theory, p. 242.
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II.

Imperfect Capital Markets and the Allocatio n of Capital Within the
Capitalis t Sector
The models of the previous section dealt with the capitalis t sector in ag

gregate terms.

For many purposes it is necessary to,recogn iie explicitl. y that

the national wealth is composed of many separate capitals (or fortunes) , that
is, of many separate concentra tions of wealth each under the control of speci

fic individua ls or families.

This would not matter if capital markets were

perfect and capital moved freely via financial intermed iaries from any speci
fic investor to any specific investmen t.

However, in underdeve loped countries

capital markets are highly imperfect and there are strong associati ons between
specific capitals P-nd specific enterpris es. 1 In many cases, enterpris e can
1 The
associati on between a particula r firm and a particula r capitalis t,
i.e., a particula r concentra tion of wealth, is strongest in small industria l
enterpris es but in general tends to hold true for larger firms as well. The
small workshop and the small and medium size factory is tYPically under the
strong control of one entrepren eur whose family holds all the equity securitie s
and whose members supply most of the organiza tional or professio nal needs. Some
entrepren eurs may have several enterpris es under their command but .seldom will
the ownership and management of a single factory be distribut ed widely. Very
large enterpris es, if organized along corporate lines can have a diversity in ownership . The corporate form allows wealth owners to spread their capital
among several enterpris es and allows entrepren eurs to obtain their capital from
many sources. This type of organizat ion can only flourish in advanced economies
where there are many large firms and broad capital markets.
The correspon dence between firms and capitalis ts can be explained in terms
of costs of obtaining informati on. The net worth of a corporati on comprises its
physical capital plus its special advantage s in technolog y, marketin g, manage
ment, etc. The firm can usually borrow from banks and other financia l intermed
iaries a certain proportio n of' the value of its tangible assets. To borrow on
the invisible assets is far more difficult be<£ause of the great· cost of communi
cating the value of these advantage s to outside creditors . The larger the firm,·
the larger its record of success:f'ul. operation s, the less its fortunes are tied
to particula r individua ls, the easier it will be able to dissemin ate relevant<
informati on and to obtain willing buyers of its equity securitie s. A small firm
has very limited opportun ities to borrow beyond its tangible assets and even a
large firm in a country with a narrow capital market might find it costly to •.
sell equity securitie s.
·
·
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only grow as fast as their particular owners accumulate personal wealth and
can only diversify as fast as their particular owners can acquire the skills
of operating in another industry.

The rate of return is thus not equalized

throughout the economy and some sectors are capital scarce while others have
a surplus.

OUr aim in this section is to analyze the inef:ficiencies in the

allocation of capital that result from separation of capitals and to relate
the degree of inefficiency to the rate of growth.

1

In order to highlight the importance of imperfect capital markets we
shall assume as a first approximation that capital cannot move at all from
one industry to another.

Investment in each industry must , therefore, be

financed solely out of profits earned in that industry and we assume that
th industry has its own industrial accumula
the representative firm in the i
tion function.
s.

].

K.]. * = -

s.].

(16)

1T.

].

where K.]. * is the rate of capital accumulation of the

.th

].

industry, s.]. is its

savings rate, v.]. capital output ratio, P.l. its price per unit of output, w1 its
wage

rate, a.]. its labor requirements per unit of output, and

'II'.

].

its profit per

unit of output.
Our goal is to relate these individual industrial accumulation functions
to the aggregate industrial accumulation punction.

It is best to begin by analyz

ing the theory of prices and profits for a single industry.

The assumption of

industry specific industrial accumulation functions can be easily seen to yield
a theory of price determination closely akin to Marshall's theory of industry
1
Here is a.n-iriterestirig relationship between this sector and our·previous
model. Her, for example, it will be shown that capitalists must earn quasi-rents
in·sufficient ~aunts to induce a required rate of growth. This.is similar to
the land model where capitalists must earn capital gains on land holdings to in
duce the required capital formation. In addition, in this section, the slowest
growing industry determines the growth of the system but there is an interesting
question of what would happen with entry. This) in turn, is not too dissimilar
to asking respectively how A expands or having if possible an increase in hectares·
(T) in our previous models.
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equili brium in the interm ediate run for a growing economy.
prices play a dual role.

In this theory ,

They are the means for balanc ing supply and demand
Figure 1 illust rates how the inter

and also a ltsigna l" for change s in supply .

A shift
media te run theory is relate d to short run and long run equil ibria.
- to P1 along
2 2
1 1
in demand f'rom D D ·to D D causes a sharp rise in price -rom P

This is the theory of price determ inatio n
1
The rise in price is follow ed by a gradu al f'all from P to

a. short run inelas tic supply curve.
in the short run.

4
~
3
P2 to P to P and so on as succes sive adjust ments a.re made until long
the indus try.
equili brium is reache d when Preac hes P the normal supply price of

-

p

Dl

-

p

\

D~ pl,·.\ 2
I
I

I'
I

-p

"

~3

' \ ··,.•''
I'
I\..,
I

p4

\

I

-,

' \,
\~,1

' '-,
\

r,2
S, D

FIGURE 1
throug h
Interm ediate run price theory is concer ned with the path of prices
the reacti on functi on relati ng the rate of' change s in
time which. depends upon
.
l price
supply , S*, to the differ ence betwee n curren t marke t price P and norma

<ii>.
S* = r(P -

P)

(17)

l price
The highe r the discre pancy betwee n curren t marke t price Blld the norma
expand and
the greate r the profit rate and hence the greate r the incen tive to

- 13 the greater the f'unds for expansion.

Given a once and for all shi:rt in demand,

the time path of prices during the adjustment process can be determined by solv

ing the differential equation of the reaction function.

In a growing economy,

demand is continuously shifting and the system never reaches long run equilibrium
but is always in some intermediate equilibrium.

The level or prices can there

fore be constant, rising, or falling depending upon the rate of expansion of
demand relative to the reaction function.

For· example, since demand is a function or price and income,the rate of
growth of demand (D*) will be a function of the rate of growth of prices (P~)
and income (Y*)

D* = e pP* + ey Y*

( 18)

where e

and e are price and income elasticities.
p
y
of supply must equal the rate of growth of demand

Since the rate of growth

r(P
- P) = epP* + ey Y*
.

(19)

e

r [ (P - P)
- - - Y Y*]
ep
r

P* = -

and

(20)

Thus price will rise or fall, i.e. P will be positive or negative, according to

-

whether the current market price P exceeds the normal price P by less or more
e

is a negative number). If the rate of growth remains
P
constant and the elasticities are stable, the system will move towards a constant

than -2 Y* (recall that e

r

price which will be a function of the rate of growth of income.
The important point about this model is that prices are a function of the
rate of growth of demand since supplies must earn quasi rents or excess profits
in sufficient amounts to induce the required rate of growth.

From the point of

view of a government setting a target rate of growth, e.n industry (or a capitalist)

is efticient or not according to the amount of excess profit it requires to grow in

- 14 step with the national plan.

Inverting equation 16 shows prices and profit

(21)

v.

,ri

1
= - K.*
1

(22) ·

Si

v.

triQ.1

1

Ki
ri =Ki- =Si
where r 1 is the i

th industry's profit rate.

(23)

Alternatively we could determine

the level of capitalist consumption as a function of the level of investment.
c.
(24)
C. = -1:. I
1

Si

The growth of different industries are interdependent since they are
linked in production and consumption and the production· of steel output , for
example, must keep pace with the production of fabricated metal products while
If

the production of shoes must keep pace with the production of clothing.

industries are related vertically or]horizontally such that their growth rates
are equal, (Ki* = Kj * = G) , prices must adjust so that the profit rates are
proportionate to their savings rates
v.
1
-8 j G
+
wia.l.

=

,r.

_l:.

,rj

ri
rj

v.
s
= _J_ l.
Si vj

(25)

(26)

s

= -1.
s

(27)

i

According to this model the profit rates will differ from industry to
industry in. proportion to dif'f'erences inproductivity and savings rate.

Ironically,

- 15 the firm with the low propensit y to save will earn a higher profit rate.

The

sluggish firm has, as it were, to be bribed by super profits to keep pace with
other firms.

The greater the rate of growth the greater the differenc e in

profit rates.

This sets up a tension in the system which can be removed in capital flows into
the industry with the low savings rate.

l

If capital moved perfectly (freely) , the

rate of return would be equalized for both industrie s and the over all rate of
profit (and rate of consumpti on) required _to achieve a target rate of growth
would be lower than in the case of imperfect markets.

The relevant equations

in this case would be:

=

G

s.+{sj-s.1. )A
l.

where A is the share of the j

th

. wealth-ho lder {assumed to have the higher

· dus t ry.
. th e 1.·th 1.n
.
rate) 1.n
savings

Unlike the previous case, the capital of

each individua l can be spread over both industrie s.

Through time A will rise

because of the faster growth of wealth of individua ls arising from this. higher
savings rate.

The profit rate required to achieve a target rate of growth will

thus decline.

In other words , the average savings rate , which always lies be

tween the savings rate of the two wealth holders will rise and approach the
savings rate of themost aggressiv e capitalis t instead of being continuou sly
2
dragged down by the sluggish one.
1Another ~djustmen t process which we shall not spell out in detail occurs
through changing prices. As equation 25 shows, relative prices are a function
ot the rate of growth. A change in relative· prices will dampen demand for the
bottlenec K sector where price is rising and hence relieve pressure. The strength
of this process will depend upon elasticit ies of substitut es.
~e usual two-secto r models of growth (FINDLAY, UZAWA; etc.) assume that
profit rates are equalized between industrie s and, in this way, "so:ive" the prob
it
lem of relative price determina tion. This is not a realistic assumptio n
r
particula
this
to
results
would be interestin g to test the sensitivi ty of their

and

assumptio n.

-.16 etely
In practi ce, capita l marke ts are neithe r compl etely perfec t nor compl
imper fect.

The streng th and speed of the second ary adjust ment proces s to

effec tive
· equali ze the rate of return s betwee n indus tries depend s upon the
rise.
ness of financ ial interm ediari es and the qualit y of busine ss enterp
doing .
· are likely to develo p throug h time via a proces s of learni ng by

These
The

limite d by the
abilit y to move capita l into the places where it is scarce is
nature of entre
indus try specif ic nature of entrep reneu rial skills . It is the
tage and to
preneu rs to seek out those indus tries in which they have an advan
gives them a
accum ulate throug h time a stock of specia lized knowledge which
rents as inquasi monopoly positi on in their specia lized activi ty and quasi
1 These skills are to some extent transf erable but time is requir ed for
come.
to build up
entrep reneur s to learn of oppor tunitie s in other indus tries and
st'ul enter 
the requir ed specia lized skills . In gener al the larger more succes
divers ify into
prices will have greate r f'lexi bility an.d a highe r prope nsity to
secto r and the
other indus tries. The more develo ped the indus trial capit alist
to equal ize
more flexib le its talent s the greate r the tenden cy f'or compe tition
ogram is its
the rate of return . In a sense , the test of the indus tializa tionpr
2
pointe d out,
succes s in develo ping flexib le entrep reneu rs. As Hirsch man has
there is an irreve rsibil ity to this proce ss:

a bottle neck tends to call forth

been broken .
entrep reneu rial.ta lent which may remain after the bottle neck has

1 see J. Bain, Barrie rs to New Comp etition .
2
Hirschman, Strate gy of Economic Growt h.

- 17 III. Conclusion
The industrializati on program of underdeveloped countries are usually pre
dicated on an infant entrepreneur argument.

In the typical case the capitalist

sector is not sufficiently productive to generate by itself a profit level consistent with the desired rate of industrial development.

-

Instead, the govern-

ment attempts hot-house fashion to manufacture businessmen or capitalists.

Var

ious government instruments--t ariff protection, subsidies, tax credits, infra
structure--are used to raise the price received by the capitalists for his output
or to lower the price he pays for his input.

These aids, the burden of which

falls on the rural population and the urban labor force, ~an be viewed as an in
vestment in capitalist learning.

Industrial development by this strategy is,

therefore, a race between the amount of surplus that can be extracted from the
rest of the economy and the speed with which capitalists increase their produc
tivity and their productive savings.
Usually, a long and costly process is involved, especially where colonialism
:frustrated the development of a native bourgeois.

The task would be much easier

if the capitalist sector could itself produce the goods required for wages, in
vestment, and capital consumption.
its own steam.

Manufacturing could then proceed largely on

Its only trading relationship with th~ rest of the economy

would be to acquire industrial labor·, which in the typical underdeveloped coun
tries is in excess supply backed up by a large reserve army, and its major
problem would be to improve productivity--a natural consequence of learning
by doing.

The problem of industrializati on, is, however, much more difficult

because the goods needed for both investment and consumption cannot be satis
fied by the output of the manufacturing sector.

In the early stages of in

dustrialization manufacturing enterprises concentrate on consumer goods cater
ing to mass markets--proces sed food, beverages, tobacco, textiles, etc.--and

- 18 must rely on agricult ure for raw materia ls and on the export sector for the
importe d capital goods used by ind11stry and the sophist icated consump tion
goods r.equire d by high income capital ists.

The capital ist sector must pro

duce goods of sufficie nt quality to induce the rest of the economy to supply
the needed inputs for its accumul ation and consump tion.

This means that it

is not sufficie nt for it to merely learn how to produce a few goods with
relative efficien cy; it must rather learn how to produce a large variety of.
goods needed by the rest of the economy and to create new goods which act as
an incentiv e to other sectors or as an interme diate good that lowers the costs.
Without this dynamic quality of increasi ng variety and improve d adaptati on
to local needs the problem s of creating a high elastic ity of supply from rural
1 Moreove r, the labor require d by the
areas becomes exceedin gly difficu lt.
capital ist sector is not merely. the direct labor required by the manufac turing
sector, which is very small, but the indirec t requirem ents of all the support ing
service s.

This includes labor in transpo rtation and distribu tion connecte d with

urban and rurai exchange and the large numbers engaged in a variety of other
urban service and manufac turing activiti es ranging from cigaret te and water
vendors to small crafts and artisan shops.

These workers are :functio nal to the

system and not merely a sponge to avoid unemplo yment.

This can be seen in the

followin g simple framewo rk.

This shows that the ratio of labor in Z--the small scale service s and ma.nu
facture s--to labor in modern manufac turing {L /L) is equal to the ratio of con

z m
1
see S. Hymer and S. Resnick , "A Model of the Agraria n Economy," American
Economic Review, forthcom ing.

- 19 ies (a and a 2 ).
1
Sumption of Z to consum ption of M weigh ted by their produ ctivit
in Z
Labor produ ctivity in manuf acturin g is much highe r than produ ctivity
produ ction
(Le., a 2 < ~) and in the early stages of indus trializ ation when
Z. Hence
is conce ntrate d on light consum er durab les, Mis much smalle r than
tailor s,
Lz is much greate r than Lm becau se of all the washe rmen, serva nts,
the
carpen ters needed to meet the demands of capit alist consum ption,
people in
demands of indus trial worke rs consum ption, and the demands of the
the Z sector itself .

The impor t of this for indus trializ ation is that the costs

of urbani zation ·which can be lessen ed only by provid ing
provid ing
a wider variet y of goods to replac e small scale produ ction or by
goods which lower the costs of urban living .
These

are the proble ms of indus trializ ation.

The impor tant variab le in

of the
judgin g the effici ency of a given strate gy is the standa rd of living
How much
major ity of the popula tion during the transi tion period and afte~.
distri buted ,
must the rural and urban popul ation bear, how will the burden be
must be based
how long will it take? The choice betwee n altern ative strate gies
local or state- 
on an estim ate.of the costs of subsid izing capita lists- -forei gn,
ency and
relati ve to the speed with which they_l earn to improv e their effici
their innova ting abilit y.
r of
The theor etical explo ration s of this paper have focuse d on a numbe
impor tant featur es of the nation al capit alist secto r.

The paper has had to

param eters.
be specu lative pecaus e of the lack of empir ical studie s of key

The

of this inform a
fact that government policy is made and debate d in the absenc e
gies for in
tion sugge sts that a seriou s study of the costs of variou s strate
dustri alizat ion has rtot been made.

We may briefl y outlin e three impor tant ave

nues of resear ch sugge sted by the models examined in this paper.
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·. ·First, there is the need to estimate the consumption function and the
portfolio balances of the capitalist sector in order t~ calculate the require
ments of forced industriali zation.
Second, it is necessary to estimate the opportunity costs of industriali 
zation by calculating the burden on the rural sector and the urban sector
from ·the demands made upon them by capitalists .
Third, research is needed on the relationshi p of size to productivit y,
and on the propensitie s of capitalists to grow and diversify, and the effect
of government policy on the size distributio n and industrial composition of
firms.
Research into other strategies is also needed.

Instead of developing a

native bourgeoisie , the government could buy the skills of owning and managing
capital from foreign corporation s.

Just as internation al trade allows a coun

try to use the production possibiliti es curve of a foreign nation, direct for
eign investment allows a country to use another country's capitalist class
for its own developmen t.

The comparative cost of the two methods both in the

short and long run should be estimated in order to ascertain the appropriat~

mix.
In general, the advantage of foreign capital is that it comes ready-made.
The disadvantag e is that it doesn't adapt itself to the environment suffici
ently and develop instruments for local searching and decision making.

Hence,

as much as it is needed in the short run, it is not a sufficient long run
strategy.
An interesting line of investigati on would be to compare various para

meters of capitalist development with those obtaining in socialist states. Since
private ownership of industry is not permitted, leakage of profits into

I.
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capitalist consumption , land speculation , foreign assets, etc., is avoided.

In

addition,wa ges to industrial workers and professiona ls are typically more re
strained.

The saving in these regards should be compared to the relative pro

ductivity of state vs. private enterprises to determine the net cost or benefit
of the different strategies.
Lastly, socialist countries usually organize enterprises on a very large
scale and substitute state planning for the decentraliz ed decision making of
individual enterpreneu rs.

Comparison must be made between the difficultie s of

planning and the difficultie s arising from imperfect capital markets as dis
cussed in Section II of this paper.

The different forms of business organiza

tion used in socialist countries probably also have an important effect on the
composition of output, for example, leading to large scale capital intensive
production, i.e., heavy industry.

The change in output in the small sector

'
resulting from collectiviz ation should also be examined.

We have consciously tried to keep out of this discussion the political dimen

sions of the various instruments of industriali zation--lar ge capital, small
capital, foreign capital, state capital.

The choice between various strategies

obviously cannot be (and is not) made simply on the economic grounds analyzed in
this essay.

